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Individuals often rely on simple heuristics when they face complex choice situations
under uncertainty. Traditionally, it has been proposed that cognitive processes are
the main driver to evaluate different choice options and to finally reach a decision.
Growing evidence, however, highlights a strong interrelation between judgment and
decision-making (JDM) on the one hand, and emotional processes on the other hand.
This also seems to apply to judgmental heuristics, i.e., decision processes that are
typically considered to be fast and intuitive. In this study, participants are exposed to
different probabilities of receiving an unpleasant electric shock. Information about electric
shock probabilities is either positively or negatively framed. Integrated skin conductance
responses (ISCRs) while waiting for electric shock realization are used as an indicator
for participants’ emotional arousal. This measure is compared to objective probabilities.
I find evidence for a relation between emotional body reactions measured by ISCRs and
the framing effect. Under negative frames, participants show significantly higher ISCRs
while waiting for an electric shock to be delivered than under positive frames. This result
might contribute to a better understanding of the psychological processes underlying
JDM. Further studies are necessary to reveal the causality underlying this finding, i.e.,
whether emotional processes influence JDM or vice versa.
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1. Introduction
Evaluating the probability of uncertain events is fundamental for human judgment and decision-
making (JDM). In order to assess the likelihood of uncertain outcomes, people often apply rules
of thumb, so-called judgmental heuristics. On the one hand, heuristics might be advantageous
by shortening the decision process or by shifting attention to important aspects of a choice
problem. On the other hand, they can lead to discrepancies between an individual’s assessment
of a situation and objective measures (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). For example, when people
estimate the likelihood of an event, they are typically influenced by current news reports. Media
coverage, however, is usually high for rare events, but low for common events, and therefore
not representative of the probability of an event. Consequently, people tend to overestimate the
probability of rare events, such as airplane accidents, and underestimate the probability of common
events, such as car accidents. This mental short-cut is known as the availability heuristic (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1973).
Studying judgmental heuristics is an important field of research for at least two distinct reasons.
First, they suggest insights into the psychology underlying human judgment and thereby improve
our understanding of individual decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). These insights
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might provide more realistic foundations for models of human
behavior (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Second, they can
explain aggregate market results, e.g., overconfidence potentially
explains excessive trading in stock markets (Barber and Odean,
1999). While traditionally it has been proposed that cognitive
processes are the main driver to reach a decision, growing
evidence stresses the importance of emotion on JDM (Ochsner
and Phelps, 2007; Angie et al., 2011; Phelps et al., 2014; Lerner
et al., 2015).
Damasio (1994), for example, argues that emotional body
signals play an important role in decision-making. According to
his theory, changes in the somatic state of an individual do not
only accompany human behavior, but they have direct influence.
This is supported by empirical evidence from studies using the
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). In the IGT, patients with damage
to the ventromedial sector of prefrontal cortices and healthy
control participants choose one card from four available decks.
While two decks are advantageous because they have a positive
expected value, the other two decks are disadvantageous in the
sense that they have a negative expected value. In the course of the
experiment, healthy participants learn to choose cards from the
advantageous decks. At the same time, they produce anticipatory
skin conductance responses (SCRs) preceding disadvantageous
decisions even before they are able to verbally express the
rule underlying this task. In contrast, patients do not follow
an optimal strategy and also lack the aforementioned body
reactions. Some of them, however, are able to verbally identify the
advantageous decks at the end of the experiment. Based on this
finding, Damasio and colleagues conclude that overt reasoning
might not be enough to make advantageous decisions and that
emotional reactions appear necessary (Bechara et al., 1994, 1996;
Damasio et al., 1996; Bechara et al., 1997).
Furthermore, Slovic and colleagues (Finucane et al., 2000;
Slovic et al., 2004, 2005) claim that affect, i.e., the experience of
emotion, has an impact on JDM. They argue that positive feelings
toward a stimulus (i.e., positive affect) would lead to a lower risk
perception, even if this does not match objective probabilities.
Negative feelings (i.e., negative affect), by contrast, would lead
to the opposite effect. This claim is supported by several studies
(Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic et al., 1991; McDaniels et al.,
1997) that find that activities with high perceived benefits are
considered to be less risky, e.g., vaccines or antibiotics. On the
other hand, activities with low perceived benefits are considered
to be more risky, e.g., smoking or alcohol consumption.
Empirical studies highlight the interplay between emotional
arousal and JDM in various settings. For example, Van’t Wout
et al. (2006) find that respondents’ SCRs in the Ultimatum Game
are higher for unfair than for fair offers. Higher emotional activity
is also associated with higher rejection rates for unfair offers.
Schmidt et al. (2013) show that participants with low resting
arousal are more likely to engage in risky gambling behavior
than participants with high resting arousal. This finding is in line
with theories stating that lowly aroused individuals might try to
reach an optimal level of arousal through participation in risky
activities. In studies by Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) and Ditto
et al. (2006), sexual arousal influences the individual likelihood
to pursue risky activities. Furthermore, emotional arousal has
an impact on inter-temporal decision-making (Sohn et al., 2015)
and also on aggregate market results (Hirshleifer and Shumway,
2003).
Recent studies address the interplay between emotion and
judgmental heuristics from different perspectives. Firstly, brain
imaging studies indicate that brain areas, which are typically
associated with emotional processes, are relevant for the
individual susceptibility to judgmental heuristics. Clark et al.
(2014), for example, analyze brain regions related to the
“gambler’s fallacy.” The authors find that participants with
injuries to the insula region, an area of the brain linked to
emotion (Singer et al., 2009), are less prone to this judgmental
heuristic. Deppe et al. (2005) find a correlation between the
degree of an individual’s susceptibility to the framing effect and
activity in the medial prefontal cortex. This area of the brain is
supposed to be important in processing emotional information
(Bechara et al., 2000). Similarly, De Martino et al. (2006) identify
a correlation between increased activation in the amygdala and
different risk-taking behavior under gain and loss frames. Among
other things, the amygdala is relevant for the identification of
emotionally relevant stimuli (Davis and Whalen, 2001).
Secondly, the effect of induced emotion on the individual
susceptibility to judgmental heuristics has been assessed. Ma
et al. (2015) show that negative emotion alters risk preferences
in a decision-making task under positive frames but not under
negative frames. Under happy induced mood, participants
exhibit greater framing effects than under sad induced mood
(Stanton et al., 2014). Moreover, Cassotti et al. (2012) find that
under a positive emotional context, the framing effect disappears.
Different dimensional representations of emotion might explain
these findings1. Additionally, in a study by Cheung and Mikels
(2011), emotional regulation leads to less risk-taking behavior
under both gain and loss frames. Reliance on emotion, however,
leads to a similar level of framing effects compared to a control
condition.
Thirdly, Sarlo et al. (2013) show an effect of framing on
emotional body reactions. In particular, the authors study how
framing of offers in the Ultimatum Game affects autonomic
responses (heart rate and SCRs). Autonomic response patterns
in men are different when offers are presented under gain (“I give
you”) and loss framing (“I take”). Women’s autonomic responses
are not affected by different frames.
Based on the stated literature above, which indicates a
relation between emotion and judgmental heuristics, this paper
addresses the impact of framing on emotional body reactions
in a risky situation. In general, framing describes a judgmental
heuristic where individuals react systematically different to the
same choice problem depending on how it is presented. For
example, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) explore how framing
affects participants’ decisions in a hypothetical life and death
situation. In their choice problem, participants choose between
two treatments for 600 potential victims of a deadly disease.
It is predicted that treatment A would lead to 400 deaths,
whereas treatment B has a 33% chance that no one would die,
1Please refer to Kaernbach (2011) and Condon et al. (2014) on dimensions of
emotion.
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but a 66% chance that everyone would die. This hypothetical
choice is presented either in a positive frame emphasizing how
many people would survive or in a negative frame emphasizing
how many people would die. In a positive frame, 72% of the
participants choose treatment A. In a negative frame, by contrast,
only 22% of the participants opt for treatment A. In this example,
participants are risk-seeking in the loss-domain but risk-averse in
the gain-domain. This finding violates rational economic theory,
which assumes that changes in frames do not alter behavior in
a systematic way. Framing effects are robust findings that are
reported in different settings (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993; Gächter
et al., 2009).
In the following experiment, I adopt the logic of attribute
framing to a risky situation2. Participants are exposed to
different probabilities of receiving an unpleasant electric shock
that are either framed with a negatively valenced proportion
(“You receive an electric shock with ..% probability.”) or with
a positively valenced proportion (“You do not receive an
electric shock with ..% probability.”). The anticipatory reactions
measured by integrated SCRs (ISCRs) while waiting for an
electric shock to be delivered are used as an indicator for
participants’ emotional arousal (Boucsein, 1992). This indicator
serves as a measure for the subjective evaluation of a situation,
and it is compared with objective measures. Due to framing
effects, negatively valenced frames, which emphasize electric
shock occurrence, might lead to higher emotional arousal than
the corresponding positively valenced frames, although electric
shock probability is the same. I tested the following hypothesis
regarding participants’ emotional arousal measured by ISCRs:
Hypothesis: Participants show higher anticipatory ISCRs when
electric shock probabilities are presented in negative frames than
when they are presented in positive frames.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Subjects
Forty undergraduate psychology students (gender: 25 female, 15
male; age: M = 22.1 years, SD = 3.1) took part in the study
in exchange for course credit points. Participants gave written
informed consent and could decide to discontinue participation
at any time. The research design was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the German Psychological Society and performed
in agreement with the Declaration of Helsinki.
2.2. Experimental Design
Each participant was exposed to 24 situations of potentially
receiving an electric shock. Electric shock probabilities were
presented on a computer screen as either “You receive an electric
shock with ..% probability.” or “You do not receive an electric
shock with ..% probability.” While the first statement represents
the negative frame, i.e., the probability of receiving an electric
shock is emphasized, the latter statement represents the positive
2According to Levin et al. (1998), framing effects can be divided into three distinct
classes: attribute framing, risky choice framing, and goal framing. Please refer to the
article for more detailed information.
frame, i.e., the probability of not receiving an electric shock is
emphasized. After presenting the electric shock probability, there
was a 7-second (s) pause until the electric shock was applied
or not with the previously stated probability. The outcome of
this lottery was visualized by a red screen in the case of an
electric shock and a green screen in the case of no electric
shock. The next round started after 10 s. Three different electric
shock probabilities were applied–20, 50, and, 80%–while each
probability was presented four times in a positive frame and four
times in a negative frame. The order of electric shock probabilities
and their outcomes were randomized.
Participants were first instructed in written form and
then verbally. In addition, participants completed a short
questionnaire testing whether they could infer the probability
of receiving an electric shock from both negative and positive
framed statements. The average duration of one session
was approximately 25 minutes (min). The software package
Psychtoolbox-3 (www.psychtoolbox.org) running on MATLAB
7.1 (MathWorks Inc., United States) was used for stimulus
presentation and response acquisition.
2.3. Electric Shock Stimulation
Electric shock was delivered via electric stimulation with a
Canicom 800 (Num’Axes, France) (Levels of stimulation: 15;
frequency of each single stimulation burst: 1.023 Hertz (Hz);
duration of the whole stimulation burst: 115 ms; power range:
0.5–206 milliwatt). The stimulation was administered via two
flat AG-AGCL electrodes of 10 millimeters (mm) in diameter
being placed at the medial phalanges of digits II and III of the
dominant hand. Individual levels of electric shock stimulation
were calibrated using the following standard procedure: electric
shocks were presented in an ascending series of intensity until the
participant indicated that the electric shock was painful. Once a
painful level was reached, the previous non-painful stimulation
level was used during the experiment.
2.4. Psychophysiological Measurements
I used a 16-channel bioamplifier (Nexus-16, Mind Media B.V.,
the Netherlands) and the corresponding recording software
Biotrace (Mind Media B.V.) to record electrodermal responses.
Two flat AG-AGCL 10-mm-diameter electrodes were placed
at the medial phalanges of digits II and III of the non-
dominant hand. In accordance with common recommendations
(Roth et al., 2012), the electrode sites were prepared with
an isotonic paste (TD-246, Discount Disposables, U.S.A.), and
there was a 5-min pause between attaching the electrodes and
starting recording. Skin conductance (SC) data were sampled at
32 Hz.
2.5. Data Analysis
SC data were analyzed using Ledalab (www.ledalab.de) applying
continuous decomposition analysis to disentangle phasic
components from tonic activity (Benedek and Kaernbach, 2010).
The ISCR, which is defined as the time integral of the phasic
driver for a relevant time interval, was used as a measure for the
phasic electrodermal response to a given stimulus. In order to
account for the typical skewed distribution of the magnitude of
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electrodermal responses, individual ISCRs were standardized by
the formula Log ISCR = log(1+ |ISCR|)× sign(ISCR) (Venables
and Christie, 1980; Benedek and Kaernbach, 2011).
In order to measure sensitivity toward the likelihood of
receiving an electric shock, ISCRs were computed for the 4-s
window starting 3 s after revealing electric shock probability. I
skipped the first 3 s to give participants enough time to realize
the given electric shock probability and to discard any effect due
to visual processing.
For ANOVA analysis, degrees of freedom were corrected
by means of the Greenhouse-Geisser (G-G) method where
necessary.
3. Results
Figure 1 shows the averaged phasic driver for positive vs.
negative framing over all electric shock probabilities. At 2.5 s
after announcement of electric shock probability, SCRs reached
a peak. The reaction in SCRs reflects visual processing (Boucsein,
1992). At approximately 3 s, the averaged phasic driver split for
both conditions and the averaged driver for the negative framed
electric shock probabilities remained above the averaged driver
for the positive framed electric shock probabilities. Around 8.2 s,
the electric shock was processed in the SC data.
Additionally, Figure 2 shows Log ISCRs [microsiemens (µS)
× s] for the 4-s time interval starting 3 s after the announcement
of electric shock probability for all combinations of electric shock
probabilities and framing. A Two-Way ANOVA for repeated
measurements revealed a significant main effect for framing:
F(1, 39) = 7.61, p = 0.01, η
2
p = 0.16. The event type,
i.e., the probability of receiving an electric shock, also had a
significant main effect on Log ISCRs [G-G corrected (ε = 0.99)] :
F(1.99, 77.51) = 12.30, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.24. This finding
replicates a result from Ring and Kaernbach (2015). Please refer
to the article for more detailed information. There was no
significant interaction between framing and event type [G-G
corrected (ε = 0.82)] : F(1.65, 64.22) = 0.57, p = 0.54, η
2
p = 0.01.
4. Discussion
As a result, I find evidence for emotional body reactions
corresponding to the framing effect. Under negative frames,
participants show significantly higher ISCRs while waiting for
an electric shock to be delivered than under positive frames.
This finding challenges the assumptions of rational economic
theory, which state that changes in frames do not alter individual
assessments of a situation in a systematic way. Furthermore,
it is relevant, because it points toward a connection between
emotion and JDM, which is also indicated in recent theories, e.g.,
the somatic marker theory by Damasio and colleagues (Bechara
et al., 1994, 1996; Damasio et al., 1996; Bechara et al., 1997)
FIGURE 2 | Averaged ISCRs for positive vs. negative framing. Error bars
indicate the within-participant standard errors of the mean.
FIGURE 1 | Averaged phasic driver for positive vs. negative framing. Shaded areas indicate the within-participant standard errors of the mean.
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or the affect heuristic by Slovic and colleagues (Finucane et al.,
2000; Slovic et al., 2004, 2005). The following discussion has
three main parts. The first part relates my result to previous
research on judgmental heuristics and emotion. The second part
concerns the experimental design and its limitations. Finally, the
relation among judgmental heuristics, intuition, and emotion is
considered.
While this study uses a psychophysiological measure to study
judgmental heuristics, several studies applied brain imaging
techniques (Deppe et al., 2005; De Martino et al., 2006; Clark
et al., 2014). The general finding of these studies is that brain
areas, which are typically associated with emotional processes, are
relevant for the individual susceptibility to judgmental heuristics.
The finding of this paper is in line with these studies, highlighting
an interplay between emotion and judgmental heuristics. Recent
studies by Cheung and Mikels (2011), Cassotti et al. (2012),
Stanton et al. (2014), and Ma et al. (2015) have addressed the
interplay between emotion and judgmental heuristics on the
behavioral level. These studies analyze how induced emotion
affects the individual susceptibility to judgmental heuristics and
thereby behavior. Although these papers also indicate a link
between emotion and judgmental heuristics, the perspective in
this paper is a different one. In this paper, distinctive bodily
states are elicited from a passive exposure to an aversive event.
Information about the situations is positively or negatively
framed, i.e., the effect of different formulations of the same
content on body reactions is studied. This approach is most
related to the previously mentioned study by Sarlo et al. (2013)
showing different autonomic response patterns for men under
gain and loss frames in the Ultimatum Game. Two main
differences, however, exist. First, Sarlo et al. (2013) use monetary
incentives to stimulate gains and losses. In this study, negative
events are realized by means of receiving an unpleasant electric
shock. Positive events are realized by means of not receiving an
unpleasant electric shock. The choice of electric shocks instead
of monetary stimuli is due to potential problems of simulating
monetary losses in experimental setups. For a further discussion
on this topic, see Berns et al. (2008). Second, outcomes in the
study by Sarlo et al. (2013) are deterministic. In my study,
the results are uncertain, i.e., whether participants in a given
situation receive an electric shock or not. Real-world decisions
are typically uncertain and rarely deterministic. Finally, this
paper also relates to studies that show that emotional arousal
impacts decision-making (Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Ariely
and Loewenstein, 2006; Ditto et al., 2006; Van’t Wout et al., 2006;
Schmidt et al., 2013; Sohn et al., 2015). The passive nature of
my experimental design is discussed in the following part of the
paper.
I measure body reactions while individuals assess the riskiness
of a situation without active decision requirement. This was
done, because as the experimenter I can not clearly detect
the precise timing of a decision. Thus, differentiation between
a pre- and post-decision phase would require some form of
participants’ behavior allowing participants to communicate
that they have reached a decision. Preparation for motor
activation and motor activation itself, however, could potentially
contaminate recorded body reactions (Boucsein, 1992). Focusing
on a passive situation in my design seems to be a more
consistent approach. The described approach, however, has
some limitations. First, decision phase and emotional body
reactions are disentangled. Therefore, this design does not
allow any statement regarding the causality of my finding,
i.e., whether emotional processes influence JDM or vice versa.
Second, my design does not identify to which extent a particular
individual is biased by the framing heuristic. Therefore, I
can only make aggregate conclusions. In essence, it is known
from the related literature that people’s decisions are influenced
by framing effects, and I find on an aggregate level body
reactions corresponding to this heuristic. It would be interesting,
however, to see whether individuals, who are more heavily
influenced by the framing heuristic, also show bigger differences
in their emotional reactions. This question might be answered
by testing individuals by the degree to which they are guided
by this heuristic and then analyzing their emotional body
reactions in the described way. Most studies on framing
effects, however, apply between-participant designs (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981). An exception is a study by Stanovich andWest
(1998).
Finally, the relation among judgmental heuristics, intuition,
and emotion deserves further attention. Heuristics are generally
considered to be a form of intuitive decision-making, in the sense
that these processes are beyond people’s conscious awareness
(Hogarth, 2010). Moreover, some authors consider affect, i.e., the
experience of emotion, as typically the first and automatically
evoked reaction toward a stimulus (“We do not just see ‘a house’:
We see a handsome house, an ugly house, or a pretentious house”
(Zajonc, 1980, p. 154). These first reactions are supposed to
influence information processing and thereby JDM. If heuristics
are guided by intuitive processes and emotions are typically
the first reaction to a stimulus, it appears reasonable to assume
that there should be a connection between judgmental heuristics
and emotion. In this paper, I am able to identify emotional
body reactions corresponding to the framing effect. These
body reactions occur before, i.e., in anticipation of, a negative
stimulus. This finding potentially motivates further studies
analyzing causal links among judgmental heuristics, intuition,
and emotion.
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